In most classical models of belief change, epistemic states are represented by theories (AGM) or formulas (Katsuno-Mendelzon) and the new pieces of information by formulas. The Representation Theorem for revision operators says that operators are represented by total preorders. This important representation is exploited by Darwiche and Pearl to shift the notion of epistemic state to a more abstract one, where the paradigm of epistemic state is indeed that of a total preorder over interpretations. In this work, we introduce a 3-valued logic where the formulas can be identified with a generalisation of total preorders of three levels: a ranking function mapping interpretations into the truth values. Then we analyse some sort of changes in this kind of structures and give syntactical characterizations of them.
Introduction
Classical propositional logic is the most common choice when studying and modelling belief change operators (see for instance [10, 19, 20] ). In the classical AGM framework [1, 11] , for instance, epistemic states are represented by theories and new pieces of information by propositional formulas. In the Katsuno-Mendelzon (KM) framework [13] , on the other hand, epistemic states as well as new pieces of information are propositional formulas. In both AGM and KM settings, the new information is intended to express a fact about the world and this new knowledge must always be included in the epistemic state resulting from the revision process.
A very useful tool in order to understand the logical model is the Representation Theorem for revision operators. It says that operators are represented by assignments mapping epistemic states to total preorders and the output is a formula or theory having as models the minimal models of the new piece of information with respect to the preorder associated to the old epistemic state. As a matter of fact, this tool is exploited by Darwiche and Pearl [9] to shift the notion of epistemic state to a more abstract one, where the paradigm of epistemic state is indeed that of a total preorder over interpretations. In our view, this work together with Boutilier's Natural Revision [8] is one of the most influential in a series of works trying to capture some kinds of semantical behavior via a syntactical characterization [6, 7, 12, 16, 15, 17, 18, 21] .
In this work, we follow this tradition but in a new way. The semantical structures of preorders are represented in a language. In order to do that, we introduce a 3-valued logic with modalities where the formulas can be identified with a generalisation of total preorders of three levels: a ranking function mapping interpretations into the truth values.
The typical situation we want to model here is as follows. There is an intelligent agent working within a finite propositional 3-valued logic on n variables. Each variable in this logic, as customary, represents an atomic "fact" about the world. We chose a 3-valued logic because this agent does not necessarily have an opinion -or knowledge-about every single atomic fact.
Our agent has classified all the possible worlds, i.e. all the truth assignments into three blocks L 1 , L 2 and L 3 . Those in L 1 are the most plausible scenarios. Assignments in L 2 are assignments about which the agent is uncertain. She doesn't know wether to accept or reject these worlds. At the level L 3 the agent puts the worlds which she considers unlikely.
In the same manner as propositional classical logic captures all the structures at two levels (accepted or rejected), we present here a logic in which the formulas capture all the three levels' structures. In order to do that, we propose here the use of the Kleene Strong three valued logic [3] plus two modalities which will be necessary for the completeness of the representation.
Thus, with the help of this logic, we can model belief change under uncertainty. In order to understand the mechanisms which govern the changes, we begin with a particular operator we call Cautious Improvement. The way to describe the changes produced in the old epistemic state by the new piece of information is reminiscent of the changes produced by the improvement operators introduced in [16] (see also [15, 17] ).
It is worth to note that in our framework, both the (old) epistemic state and the new piece of information are formulas. Since they are formulas in our new logic, they are both (complex) epistemic states. Therefore, we return, in a natural way, to the paradigm of revising an epistemic state by an epistemic state first proposed by Benferhat et al. in [2] .
The operator of cautious improvement is characterized syntactically. An analysis of the techniques involved in the definition and in the syntactical characterization allows us to find a general method for defining all the operators under uncertainty and extract syntactic postulates that characterize them.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Kleene strong 3-valued logic with two new modalities is defined. Therein is proven that every ranking function mapping interpretations into an ordered scale of three elements can be represented by a formula of this new logic. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of the cautious improvement operator and its syntactic characterization. In Section 4 we characterize each of the 3 9 (19,683) possible change operators in our logic. In Section 5 we compare our results with other works in the literature. In Section 6, we conclude with some remarks and give some lines of future development of this work. Finally, in Appendix A we give a combinatorial proof of the necessity of our two modalities in order to be able to represent all the "total preorders" over interpretations of three levels (Theorem 2).
The Logic
We work within a modal variant of finite K S 3 , the Kleene strong 3-valued logic [14] (see also [3] ), with variables x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 . We will call Var n the set of these variables. The usual version of K S 3 has the same syntax as classic propositional logic. We include the symbol '⊥' as the logical constant that always evaluates to 0. For the semantics, we have three possible truth values: 1 representing truth, 0 for falsehood and 1/2 for non-determined. The truth tables for the connectives are the following:
For the sake of brevity, let's say that a valuation ω is a quasi-model of θ iff ω(θ) = 1/2 and a countermodel of θ ′ if ω(θ ′ ) = 0. Then we say that ω is a quasi-model of a set Σ iff it is a quasi-model for all the formulas in Σ. The notion of model is the same as in classic propositional logic. A formula is a contradiction if it only has countermodels.
Regarding semantics, we have to define some usual symbols:
1. For two formulas α, β we write ≡ when they have the same truth table.
2. We write α β when every model of α is a model of β i.e. we use this symbol with its classic interpretation.
3. We write α β to abbreviate α β and β α.
Note that in this logic there are no tautologies. Actually, it is easy to check that for all interpretation ω taking the constant value 1 2 , we have that for every formula ϕ, ω(ϕ) = 1 2 . We extend K S 3 by adding the modal operators ♦ 1 and 1 . Our syntax is also extended by the new formation rule stating that if ϕ is a formula then ♦ 1 ϕ and 1 ϕ are also formulas. The modal operators are interpreted as follows:
Intuitively, ♦ 1 worsens the truth value of ϕ and 1 improves it. It is easily noted that 1 ϕ = ¬♦ 1 ¬ϕ, so these are dual operators. Note that in K S 3 extended by 1 there are many tautologies. As a matter of fact, for every formula ϕ, the formula 1 1 ϕ is a tautology.
With the use of ♦ 1 and 1 we can find, given a truth assignment ω, a formula ϕ ω such that its only model is ω. Indeed, given a truth assignment ω = t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n−1 on Var, we have the formula
where each α i is a formula given by
This formula evaluates to 1 if, and only if, all of the α i 's evaluate to 1, thus the only model for ϕ ω is ω. Notice that it can have more than one quasi-model. On the other hand, if {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω k−1 } is a set of truth assignments, the formula
has the interpretations in {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω k−1 } as its only models. We can also give "normal" forms that allow us to "push" the modal operator ♦ 1 within parentheses. One can easily check that
On the other hand, for reasons that will become apparent later, we are going to introduce the modal operator ♦ 2 and its dual 2 whose semantics are given by the truth tables
It is also easy to check that
We denote by K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 the modal extension of K S 3 by ♦ 1 and ♦ 2 and by K S 3 + ♦ i the extension by ♦ i for i = 1, 2. The set of all the formulas in this logic is denoted by F.
Formulas and preorders
In the finite case, K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 over the set of variables
we have the set I n = {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω 3 n −1 } containing all the interpretations on Var n . Each formula ϕ in K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 induces a partition of I n into three blocks L 1 (ϕ), L 2 (ϕ) and L 3 (ϕ) defined as
It is easy to check that the relation ϕ , defined as
is a 'total preorder'. Thus, the first level contains the worlds accepted by ϕ; the second level contains the uncertain worlds of ϕ and the third level contains the worlds rejected by ϕ.
More precisely, we can see ϕ as a ranking function r ϕ :
when ω ∈ L 2 (ϕ) and r ϕ (ω) = 0 when ω ∈ L 3 (ϕ). We regard L 1 (ϕ), L 2 (ϕ) and L 3 (ϕ) as the levels of ϕ . Notice that every formula defines one of these three-level preorders (ranking function). Such a preorder must have at least one non empty level.
Given a ranking function r : I n −→ {0, 1 2 , 1} we also use the notation L j (P ) for levels on the preorder P defined by it, that is ωP ω ′ iff r(ω) ≥ r(ω ′ ) and L 1 (P ) = r −1 (1), L 2 (P ) = r −1 ( 1 2 ) and L 3 (P ) = r −1 (0). Note that these 'preorders' are indeed more general than total preorders. For instance, with ranking functions we can distinguish different constant functions mapping all the interpretations to different levels, whereas considered as simply total preorders, all these different ranking functions are identified with the same flat total preorder. By abuse of notation, in this work we will continue to call three-level preorder P , any partition in three levels given by a ranking function r : I n −→ {0, 1 2 , 1}. We will prove that for every three-level preorder P on I n there is a formula in K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 that characterizes it. Theorem 1. Given a three-level preorder P in I n , there is a formula φ P in K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 such that for every interpretation ω in I n :
Proof. We know, due to Equation 1, that there are formulas ψ 1 , ψ 2 and ψ 3 such that ω(P ) = 1 if and only if ω ∈ L j (P ). Define the formula
For the characterization of the second level, we have
On the other hand,
It is not possible to have ω(♦ 2 ψ 3 ) = 1/2 because the truth value of ♦ 2 ψ 3 is either 1 or 0 under any interpretation, thus it must be ω(♦ 1 ψ 2 ) = 1/2, so ω(ψ 2 ) = 1 and as a consequence ω ∈ L 2 (P ).
Hence
for any interpretation ω. Finally, for the third level:
For the converse, we have
Henceforth φ P captures the preorder P .
Theorem 1 shows that every preorder on I n is characterized by a formula in K S 3 +♦ 1 +♦ 2 . In Theorem 2 we prove that both ♦ 1 and ♦ 2 are needed for this.
is not enough to define every 3-level preorder on I n .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. There are three-level preorders on all the interpretations on Var n that can not be defined by any formula in K S 3 .
The Cautious Improvement Operator
We want to define a belief revision operator of the kind * : F × F −→ F Thus, in this framework we are going to represent both epistemic states and epistemic inputs by formulas in K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 . Also the outputs will be represented by the same type of formulas.
Definition of the operator
For a fixed n ∈ N we first define * as a binary operator on 3-level preorders over I n . The following table gives the level of an interpretation ω in ϕ * θ given the levels where it is located in ϕ and θ :
We have defined * as a binary operator on preorders. Thanks to Theorem 1, we can define * as a binary operator on formulas, but still referring to preorders: given formulas ϕ and θ, the formula ϕ * θ is the one corresponding to the preorder ϕ * θ . Also notice that ϕ * θ = ϕ * θ .
We can make two observations: First, Table 2 yields a truth table for ϕ * θ ϕ θ ϕ * θ
Second, via the identification of formulas with preorders we can write L j (φ) instead of L j ( φ ) for any given formula φ. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of this operator.
Postulates
Lemma 1. The Cautious Improvement Operator satisfies the following postulates
Figure 1: Example of operator's behavior
In the second case, we have ω
and ω ∈ L 2 (ϕ). Hence ω ∈ L 1 (ϕ * θ) by Table 2 and ω(ϕ * θ) = 1.
Conversely, if ω(ϕ * θ) = 1 then ω ∈ L 1 (ϕ * θ). There are only two cases in Table 2 that make this possible:
Then either ω((( 1 ϕ ∧ 1 ¬ϕ) ∧ ¬θ)) = 1 or ω(¬ϕ ∧ ¬θ) = 1. In both cases ω(¬θ) = 1 which implies that ω ∈ L 3 (θ). In the first case,
In the second case, ω(¬θ) = 1 implies that ω ∈ L 3 (ϕ) ∩ L 3 (θ). In both cases ω ∈ L 3 (ϕ * θ) by Table 2 , thus ω(¬(ϕ * θ)) = 1.
If ω(¬(ϕ * θ)) = 1 then ω ∈ L 3 (ϕ * θ). The only options given in Table 2 are
Lemma 2. If ⋆ is any binary operator on F satisfying CI1 and CI2 then ⋆ is the Cautious Improvement operator.
We have to prove that L j (ϕ ⋆ θ) = L j (ϕ * θ) for j = 1, 2, 3, i.e., that ϕ ⋆ θ ≡ ϕ * θ.
Given any interpretation ω
Finally, suppose ω ∈ L 2 (ϕ ⋆ θ). As we are assuming that ⋆ satisfies CI1 and CI2, this is equivalent to Hence
Theorem 3. Postulates CI1 and CI2 characterize the Cautious Improvement operator.
Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2.
We can obtain simpler, yet less intuitive, expressions for CI1 and CI2.
Theorem 4. The following are equivalent, respectively, to CI1 and CI2:
Proof. According to CI1,
It is easy to check, using truth tables, that
And again, using truth tables, it is easy to check that
It is worth to note that Theorem 4 tells us that the cautious improvement operator can be expressed as a formula of of the logic K S 3 + ♦ 1 + ♦ 2 in terms of their inputs.
Theorem 5. Given any two formulas ϕ and θ:
If θ is not a contradiction, then ϕ * θ is not a contradiction (CI4)
Proof. These six properties can be checked out using truth tables.
Properties CI4 and CI5 respectively represent the Non Contradiction and the Success principles. On the other hand, CI7 and CI8 tell us how the iterative behavior of this operator works. It takes exactly two steps to completely replace the original epistemic state with the new information.
General definition of a belief change operator
Now we want to define a general belief change operator.
defines a binary operator ⊗ on three-level preorders over I n given by the table:
Given formulas ϕ and θ, an interpretation ω is in L k(i,j) ( ϕ ⊗ θ ) if and only if ω ∈ L i (ϕ) ∩ L j (θ). This defines the preorder ϕ ⊗ θ .
Since the function k determines the operator ⊗, there are | {1, 2, 3} | |{1,2,3}| 2 = 3 3 2 = 3 9 possible belief change operators in this setting. Different functions yield operators with different epistemological attitudes. The Cautious Improvement operator defined in Section 3.1, for instance, gives priority to new information (i.e. to the models of θ) but does so in a cautious manner. For example, if an interpretation ω is a counter model of ϕ and it is a model of θ then it will be, not a model, but a quasi model of ϕ * θ. Another example could be the one given by the following table:
It is easy to see that ϕ • θ ≡ θ for every pair of formulas ϕ and θ. This operator gives absolute priority to the new information. Also notice that
Once defined ⊗ as a binary operator on preorders, we can use Theorem 1 to define ⊗ as a binary operator on formulas.
From Table 3 we can obtain a syntactic characterization of ⊗. In order to do this, we need to define a set of formulas
as follows. For every triple (i, j, k):
Observe that for any interpretation ω, regardless the value of k, ω(α k i ) = 1 iff ω ∈ L i (ϕ) and ω(β k j ) = 1 iff ω ∈ L j (ϕ). Now we are able to give a syntactic definition of ⊗. Theorem 6. The following postulates characterize the operator ⊗:
We divide the proof of Theorem 6 into two lemmas:
Lemma 3. The operator ⊗ defined by the Table 3 satisfies Postulates ⊗1, ⊗2 and ⊗3.
Proof. Let us denote:
Notice that for any interpretation ω
Suppose ω is an interpretation that satisfies 1≤i≤j≤3 ζ k ij . Thus, there is a pair i, j such that ζ k ij = ⊥, i.e., ζ k ij is a conjunction α k i ∧ β k j such that Table 3 and ω(φ k ) = 1.
Conversely, suppose that ω(φ k ) = 1, then ω ∈ L k (ϕ * θ). According to the definition of ⊗ by Table 3 there is a pair i, j such that
Lemma 4. If an operator ⋆ satisfies Postulates ⊗1, ⊗2 and ⊗3 then ⋆ and ⊗ are the same operator.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
Related works
There are some interesting works linking modal logic and belief revision. Namely, the works of Giacomo Bonanno [4, 5] . The aim of these works is to give modal logics in which the process of revision can be simulated and the original postulates of the AGM framework are satisfied. Our aim is different in at least two aspects. First, the processes of change we want to capture in our model differ from the changes proposed in the AGM or KM (Katsuno-Mendelzon) framework where the believes before the change (and after it) are represented either as a classical propositional theory or as a classical propositional formula. We model change in a bit more complex structures. The purpose of the 3-valued logic with modalities we use is to be able to represent these structures through the formulas of the logic and the semantics associated. The second aspect in which our approach differs from those works is in our postulates, which come naturally from the complex process we want to model. We may say that our approach to the syntactic postulates is oriented by semantics and this leads to the discovery of the axioms. It is worth to note that our modalities of type one (♦ 1 and 1 ) are related to ideas on improvement operators [16, 15, 17] . Actually, 1 is similar to the operator of one improvement introduced in those works: the effect of this modality consists of improving by one degree the plausibility of all worlds, whenever possible. Of course, our structures of three levels do not allow to simulate completely operators as the one-improvement operator, because these operators can create new levels in the process of revision. In order to simulate that, we should have structures with at least 3 n levels, the maximal length of a total preorder on I n .
Note that Hans Root in his work Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators [21] analyses the behavior of 27 change operators looking at the changes in spheres' systems (alias total preorders). Our work is reminiscent of this approach and the subtitle of our work is a sort of tribute to his work.
6 Final remarks and future research
Remarks
This work is a first step in order to have a logic in which formulas represent complex epistemic states, such as ranking functions on interpretations, a generalization of total preorders. We have concentrated here in ranking functions taking three values: acceptation, rejection and indetermination. Mainly, there are three contributions in this work which we want to remark here: 1. We have defined a modal expansion of the Kleene's strong 3-valued logic that allows us to describe three-level preorders associated with any formula ϕ in this logic. Level L 1 (ϕ), L 2 (ϕ) and L 3 (ϕ) are respectively the sets of models, quasi models and countermodels of ϕ.
2.
We have defined semantically all the change operators (3 9 ) and, what is most important, we have introduced a technique to characterize them syntactically in the Kleene's strong 3-valued logic with modalities.
3. We have concentrated in a particular, natural and meaningful operator, called cautious improvement operator. This operator has been characterized through two postulates. Moreover, there is a formula of the new logic constructed in terms of two formulas which are the input of the operator (the old beliefs and the new piece of information) such that this formula captures the output of the operator (Theorem 4).
4.
We have characterized all possible change operators (19, 683 in total) in the three-level structures following the methodology used for characterizing the cautious improvement operator.
Future work
The main issues we want to develop next are the following:
• To define a complete proof theory for Kleene's strong 3-valued logic expanded with ♦ 1 and ♦ 2 .
• To characterize a class of operators in which the new piece of information does not worsen, that is, it shifts downwards.
• To understand when the operators have a representation as in Theorem 4, that is, when the formula corresponding to ϕ * θ can be expressed in terms of ϕ and θ within
• To generalize the Kleene's strong 3-valued logic with modalities to a modal 3 n -valued logic which can capture all the ranking functions into 3 n values and find the way to encode in such a logic all known classes of operators.
Let us call P 0 1 the closure of the set {P 0 } under these three operations and P 0 1 k the set of the preorders obtained after k or less successive applications of {¬, 1 , ∨}.
Let us say the preorder P belongs to the set F 1 if and only if it has one of the following forms:
We will prove that no preorder in F 1 belongs to P 0 1 . We do it by induction in the number of steps, being our base case the application of the operations to P 0 . These yield:
Obviously none of those preorders belongs to F 1 .
Now suppose that no preorder in F 1 belongs to P 0 1 k . Given a sequence P i 0 , P i 1 , . . . , P i k , P i k+1 of preorders with i 0 = 0 such that P i j+1 is obtained from P i j by an application of one of our operators, suppose, for a contradiction, that P i k+1 is in F 1 . Then: (a) If P i k+1 = ¬P i k then P i k must be in F 1 which is a contradiction. (b) If P i k+1 = 1 P i k then L 3 (P i k+1 ) is empty thus it is not a linear order and it has a level which is empty other than L 2 (P i k+1 ) hence P i k+1 is not in F 1 .
(c) If P i k+1 = P i k ∨ P ′ with P ′ a preorder in P 0 1 k : • Suppose P i k+1 is a linear order with ω 2 in L 3 , i.e.
then ω 2 must be in both L 3 (P i k ) and L 3 (P ′ ) and ω ′ must be in L 1 (P i k ) or L 1 (P ′ ). Without loss of generality, we may assume that ω 2 ∈ L 3 (P ′ ) and ω ′ ∈ L 1 (P ′ ). Then necessarily either ω ∈ L 2 (P ′ ) and P ′ = P i k+1 or L 2 (P ′ ) = ∅ in P ′ . In both cases, we can conclude that P ′ ∈ F 1 .
• Similarly, if P i k+1 is a linear order with ω 2 in L 1
then ω must be in both L 3 (P i k ) and L 3 (P ′ ) and ω 2 must be either in L 1 (P i k ) or L 1 (P ′ ). Again, suppose without loss of generality that P ′ has ω in L 3 and ω 2 in L 1 . If ω ′ is not in L 2 for P ′ then this level is empty and if ω ′ is in L 2 then P ′ = P i k+1 . In both cases, we have P ′ ∈ F 1 .
• If P i k+1 has the form ω ∅ ω ′ ω ′′ then necessarily:
ω belongs to level L 3 (P k ) and L 3 (P ′ ).
ω ′ must be either in L 1 (P k ) or L 1 (P ′ ).
ω must be either in L 1 (P k ) or L 1 (P ′ ). Suppose that ω ′ and ω ′′ are in L 1 (P ′ ), then
If this is not the case then necessarily
We examine only the case P ′ = ω ω ′ ω ′′ since the other one is symmetric. In this case, necessarily P k = ω ω ′′ ω ′ then one of those two preorders is linear with ω 2 in one of the extreme levels, hence one of them is in F 1 • Finally, suppose that If P i k+1 has the form ω ′ ω ′′ ∅ ω then both P k and P ′ must have ω ′ and ω ′′ in L 3 and one of them has to have ω in L 1 . Suppose that P ′ satisfies these two properties, then P ′ = P i k+1 and as a consequence P ′ ∈ F 1 .
As we can see, on each case we contradict the inductive hypothesis, thus it is not possible that P i k+1 ∈ F 1 without incurring in a contradiction. Hence, P i k+1 / ∈ F 1 thus no element of F 1 belongs to the closure of P 0 under the given operations. As a consequence of this, there are preorders in P that have no corresponding formula in K S 3 + ♦ 1 .
2. Now to prove that K S 3 + ♦ 2 , in the finite case, cannot capture all the preorders, we define a new operator 2 for every preorder P as
Let us denote by P 0 2 the closure of {P 0 } under operators ¬, 2 , ∨ and by P 0 2 k the set of the preorders obtained by k or less successive applications of these operators. Let F 2 denote the set of the preorders with one of the following configurations:
We will prove, using induction in the number of steps, that P ∈ P 0 2 implies that P is not in F 2 .
Our base case consists of applying this operators to P 0 . As we saw in Equation 5, neither ¬P 0 nor P 0 ∨ P 0 belong to F 2 . On the other hand
For the inductive hypothesis, assume that no preorder in P 0 2 k belongs to F 2 . Suppose we have a sequence P i 0 , P i 1 , . . . , P i k , P i k+1 of preorders with i 0 = 0 such that P i j+1 is obtained from P i j by an application of one of our operators and assume for a contradiction that P i k+1 is in F 2 . Hence:
(c) If P i k+1 = P i k ∨ P ′ with P ′ a preorder in P 0 2 k we need to consider seven cases. i. If P i k+1 has the form ω 2 ω ′ ω then ω 2 belongs to L 3 (P i k ) and L 3 (P ′ ) and ω must be either in L 1 (P i k ) or L 1 (P ′ ). If ω is in L 1 (P ′ ) then P ′ must have the form ω 2 ω ′ ∅ ω since otherwise it would be in F 2 . But then ω ′ must be in L 2 (P i k ) and as a consequence we obtain that P i k is in F 2 wherever we place ω because P i k would be in one of the following forms
and ω 2 ∈ L 1 (P ′ ), then we must have ω ′ ∈ L 3 (P ′ ) or, otherwise, P ′ belongs to F 2 thus P ′ must have the form ωω ′ ∅ ω 2 But in this case we must have ω ′ ∈ L 2 (P i k ) and this implies that P i k is in one of the following forms:
iii. Suppose P i k+1 has the form ∅ ωω ′ ω ′′ ∅ If neither P i k nor P ′ have this form, there are two possible combinations that yield this:
, ω ′ there are two sub cases to consider. First, suppose without loss of generality that ω 2 and ω ′ belong to L 1 (P ′ ) then, as P ′ is not in F 2 , we must have P ′ = ω ∅ ω 2 ω ′ In this case ω must be at L 2 (P i k ). If P i k is linear ω 2 is in L 1 (P i k ) or L 3 (P i k ) and it is in F 2 . Thus suppose P i k is not linear, hence it must have ω 2 and ω ′ at the same level and wherever we put ω 2 , ω ′ we obtain that P i k is in F 2 . Suppose now, without loss of generality, that ω 2 is in L 1 (P i k ) and ω ′ is in L 1 (P ′ ). Observe that P i k cannot be linear in this case and that we already examined the case when ω 2 and ω ′ are both in L 1 (P i k ), thus we can suppose ω and ω ′ are at the same level, which must be L 2 or L 3 . If ω and ω ′ are in L 2 (P i k ) then P i k = ∅ ωω ′ ω 2 which belongs to F 2 . If, on the other hand, ω and ω ′ are in L 3 (P i k ) we have that P i k = ωω ′ ∅ ω 2 thus ω is in L 2 (P ′ ) and P ′ must be in one of the following forms ω ′ ω ω 2 ∅ ωω ′ ω 2
∅ ω ω 2 ω ′ and all of these forms are in F 2 . v. Suppose P i k+1 has the form ω 2 ω ′ ω ∅
In this case we must have ω 2 , ω ′ ∈ L 3 (P i k ) and ω 2 , ω ′ ∈ L 3 (P ′ ) and necessarily either ω ∈ L 2 (P i k ) or ω ∈ L 2 (P ′ ). Thus either P i k+1 = P i k or P i k+1 = P ′ which is not possible because then P i k+1 can be obtained in k steps and it contradicts the inductive hypothesis. vi. If P i k+1 has the form ω ′′ ωω ′ ∅ then necessarily L 1 (P i k ) = L 1 (P ′ ) = ∅ and ω ′′ is in L 3 (P i k ) and L 3 (P ′ ). If neither P i k nor P ′ belong to F 2 the only combination yielding the given configuration is ωω ′′ ω ′ ∅ ∨ ω ′ ω ′′ ω ∅ as at least one of them have ω 2 at level L 3 , then at least one of them is in F 2 . vii. If P i k+1 has the form ∅ ωω ′ ω ′′ Suppose, without loss of generality, that ω, ω ′ ∈ L 2 (P ′ ) then necessarily P ′ ∈ F 2 since it must be in one of the forms
Thus we can assume that {ω, ω ′ } L 2 (P ′ ) and {ω, ω ′ } L 2 (P i k ). Since {ω, ω ′ } = L 2 (P i k+1 ) it must also be the case that {ω, ω ′ } L 3 (P ′ ) and {ω, ω ′ } L 3 (P i k ) because if, for instance, we have that {ω, ω ′ } ⊆ L 3 (P ′ ) then we need {ω, ω ′ } ⊆ L 2 (P i k ). We have a case with ω ∈ L 3 (P i k ), ω ′ ∈ L 2 (P i k ), ω ∈ L 2 (P ′ ) and ω ′ ∈ L 3 (P ′ ) (the other possible case is symmetric) but then necessarily either ω ′′ ∈ L 1 (P i k ) or ω ′′ ∈ L 1 (P ′ ). Suppose ω ′′ ∈ L 1 (P ′ ) (the other case is, again, symmetric) thus we have one of the following cases: One possibility is
in this case, we have at least one linear order with ω 2 at an extreme level, hence at least one of the preorders is in F 2 . Another possible configuration is
The remaining possibility is
If ω ′ = ω 2 and ω ′′ = ω 2 then ω = ω 2 and
